Brexit & International Criminal Law: Entering Uncharted Waters

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the implications of the British withdrawal from the European Union, commonly referred to as “Brexit,” on the function of international criminal law in the United Kingdom.  While Brexit negotiations have largely focused on changes to immigration and trade policy, much of the United Kingdom’s international criminal law enforcement and policy rely on European Union bodies and precedent.  This paper analyzes the five largest areas of United Kingdom-European Union criminal law overlap: criminal justice agencies, cooperation agreements, mutual recognition agreements, harmony of law, and harmony of criminal procedure.  Through case studies and analysis of international treaties, this paper explores each of these areas.  While many of the precise functions of international law after Brexit have the potential to change based on the specificities of exit negotiations, the entrenched legal mechanisms described here could all be subject to a variety of transformations in the coming years.  This paper seeks to understand the potential for such change more thoroughly.

 

  1. Brexit: How Did We Get Here?

Britain joined the “European Economic Community”–an open market precursor to the European Union–in 1973 without a popular referendum on the issue.[1] In 1975, Britain voted to remain in the European Economic Community, which, at the time was just a trading group of nine nations.[2]  In the 41-year interstitial period between that vote and the tabling of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum during the summer of 2016, the British public had no direct voice in their nation’s relationship with Europe.[3] During that time, the European Economic Community has evolved from an open trading group to a political union, exerting a wide range of influence over the policy and sovereignty of its member states.[4]  Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 – which formally established the European Union and imposed new areas of governance (namely in the fields of common justice/home affairs and foreign/security affairs, in addition to extant trade agreements) on the member states – various politicians and laypeople have called for a popular vote to challenge the perceived transfer of power that these restrictions entail.[5]

In 2016, the matter of continued British membership in the European Union finally came to a head.  The long period without a membership vote was only one factor that led to the public referendum. More immediately, David Cameron, the British Prime Minister at the time, wanted to resolve the European Union issue and reduce tensions within his own Conservative party.[6]  When he became leader of the party, Cameron sought  to end the party’s “banging on about Europe,” and eventually wanted to address the issue of membership in the European Union with a popular referendum.[7]  As calls for a referendum on the issue became louder, Cameron initially rejected the vote in 2012, but later said that if the Conservative Party were re-elected, he would hold a referendum on continued EU membership.[8]

Many have argued that the impetus to exit the European Union, as with other Populist movements throughout the West, such as the election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, might have resulted from several sources.[9]  Scholars claim that the pushback either reflects changes in the workforce and society of “post-industrial economies,” which are not serving the needs of the working class, or reveals a cultural resistance to increasingly progressive cultural values by a once dominant, conservative part of the population.[10]  These factors may have contributed to a growing tide of populist movements and isolationist foreign policy in Western nations.[11] Perhaps as a result of these pressures, when David Cameron’s 2016 EU Referendum went to a vote, a majority of voters decided to leave. Although the vote was intended to end divisions within the party and solidify Cameron’s Government, the results led the Prime Minister to resign and began a long and uncertain process of secession.[12] Some scholars have debated the legitimacy of the popular vote on the exit from the European Union and its terms; clear precedent exists in Article 50 of the Lisbon Treatya document, which reformed membership terms for European Union states.[13]

 

  1. What Does “Exit” Really Mean?

As no precedent exists for the departure of a member state from the EU, Brexit continues to breed uncertainty.  As such, the process of departure–the legitimacy of the popular vote, the speed at which Britain will leave the Union, the trade conditions the UK will maintain with the European Union, etc.–remains unresolved.  As a result of the continued instability and debate surrounding the Brexit process, most of the ramifications of exit from the European Union remain entirely undiscussed.  These overlooked implications include the effects of Brexit on criminal law.  In fact, unlike many other comparable areas of EU membership, criminal justice and security were not explicitly discussed in the pre-referendum debate.[14] This is important because, as mentioned above, since the Maastricht Treaty was passed in 1993, the United Kingdom’s status as an EU member state has determined aspects of its criminal justice policy.[15] Prior to that time, states were merely required to support judicial coordination in criminal affairs, which was considered the “third pillar” of European statehood.[16]  However, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into effect in late 2009, abolished the separate pillars of EU jurisdiction and expanded EU influence in criminal matters.[17] Since the inception of the Lisbon Treaty, European Union organizations and courts have increasingly involved and incorporated themselves into local governance and law.[18]

 

  1. EU Criminal Law Jurisdiction

European Union criminal law operates in five distinct areas.  The first involves shared criminal justice agencies. A group of European Union agencies exist with the explicit objective of improving criminal justice issues within member states.[19] Secondly, member states are subject to cooperation agreements. These agreements were arranged to coordinate efforts between law enforcement agencies of different EU countries, enabling those nations to address criminal activity in a globalized age and on an international stage.[20] Third, states must abide by certain judicial agreements.[21] These agreements require courts and other governing agencies or authorities in EU member states to recognize judgments issued by similar organizations in other EU countries.[22]  Fourth, judicial systems within the EU must establish harmony of substantive criminal law with other member states.[23] “Harmony” indicates a baseline correlation between substantive criminal law across member states.[24] This requirement ensures that certain acts are punishable by appropriately punitive responses, regardless of the country in which they occur.[25] Finally, states within the European Union are required to harmonize their criminal procedure.[26] In short, the process of a trial, regardless of the member state in which it takes place, must abide by similar measures.[27] These may include the rights of defendants and the establishing of minimum protection standards for crime victims.[28] Of course, Britain’s exit from the European Union will affect criminal justice through more channels than the five discussed here.  For instance, if the policy of free movement between Britain and the rest of Europe no longer continues after withdrawal, new policy could completely alter immigration law or procedures for criminals resisting arrest. The vast majority of EU influence and jurisdiction in criminal affairs, however, falls within these five categories.

 

  1. Criminal Justice Agencies: Eurojust Case Study

Several criminal justice agencies that operate within the United Kingdom are under European Union jurisdiction.  When Britain exits the European Union, these groups may cease to operate within the country. Yet the Government has not publicly discussed the future of these organizations and their role within Britain, or lack thereof, in the wake of the Brexit vote.  These agencies have been increasingly involved in the European Union Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (ASFJ).[29]  The ASFJ was created as a result of European Union reform treaties both predating and subsequent to the Lisbon Treaty.[30]  States within the area are meant to ensure the free movement of persons from one country to another and to offer a high level of protection (from internal and external legal and physical threats) to its citizens.[31]  Towards that end, a range of organizations–from the European Police College, to the European Institute for Gender Equality, Europol, and the Fundamental Rights Agency–operate within the ASFJ as a Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) network.[32]

To examine the potential implications of Brexit on international criminal justice agencies, this paper will examine one such organization within the network: Eurojust. Eurojust is a body that improves the coordination of criminal investigations and prosecutions between different organizations in member states.[33] At the request of an EU member state, the organization can assist investigation and prosecution between two member states or a member state and a non-member state.[34] Their jurisdiction concerns the same types of offenses that concern Europol–terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cyber crime, etc., and they have a wide range of authority that acts in concordance with (and sometimes outside of or even superseding) efforts by local authorities.[35]

The decentralized structures of Eurojust and other JHA organizations have led to a mixture of applicable European and national law in various member states.[36] In particular, the operations of these agencies have altered judicial procedure in three key areas.[37] First, it affects substantive procedure in the form of applicable law for the scope of judicial powers (i.e. civil liberties and procedural rights of those involved in legal action).[38]  Second, EU legislation determines institutional function in the form of the applicable law for judicial control (legislative authority of governing bodies such as Parliament).[39] Finally, EU law regulates court procedure in the form of applicable law for the admissibility of evidence.[40] These areas of influence were a deliberate outcome of the Lisbon Treaty.  Title V of the AFSJ Charter, in article 67(3), states the following:

 

The Union shall endeavor to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities (Emphasis added).[41]

 

When the operations of the European Union were reformed in 2009, the alterations were designed with the explicit intent of increased cooperation between member states and further involvement of umbrella EU organizations in local governance. In Article 85 of the Treaty for the Function of the European Union (TFEU), Eurojust was given supranational powers to increase its ability to oversee and facilitate co-operations in criminal investigation and prosecution.[42] These powers go above and beyond the scope and influence of any individual state government.

Overall, Eurojust protects the safety of European Union member states by ensuring that a diverse range of policing and governance organizations can coordinate their investigations and prosecutions. Their efforts have streamlined the process of criminal prosecution of multinational crime organizations throughout Europe, reducing crime and improving governance.  As Britain exits the European Union, it is likely in the nation’s best interest to remain within the sphere of influence of supranational organizations similar to Eurojust, to continue to reap the benefits of membership. Those organizations, however, may no longer have any jurisdiction or grounds for operation within the United Kingdom.

In the case of Eurojust, the organization was originally designed as a purely co-operative agency. At its inception in 2000 (as Pro-Eurojust), all organization employees were still technically under the supervision and jurisdiction of their respective national authorities.[43] As such, Pro-Eurojust could be more accurately understood as a criminal justice network, whose local members conducted investigations and other business at the national level and cooperated to solve international disputes. If Eurojust still operated in this manner, then perhaps Eurojust members in the United Kingdom could continue their investigations as part of the multinational organization while no longer maintaining European Union member status.  However, in 2013 the organization was reformed, which necessitated the expansion of the institutional European dimension of Eurojust by requiring that the European Union Commission manage the agency.[44] Furthermore, both European Parliament and national parliaments would evaluate Eurojust’s activities, and activity within the organization is considered part of the operation expenditures of the multinational organization rather than of an individual member state.[45] This 2013 amendment necessitates the non-involvement of Britain with the Eurojust agency once the country exits the European Union.  If Britain is not a member of the European Union, a European Union law enforcement agency whose employees work for that umbrella organization have no grounds for operations within the country.

Scaling the Eurojust case study out and examining its larger implications for European Union law enforcement agencies, it becomes clear the Brexit may hinder criminal law adjudication and prosecution in Britain. In instances where the agency’s operations and employees fall under the jurisdiction of the European Union, organizations will no longer have any grounds upon which to legitimize their presence and continued authority in Britain.

 

  1. Cooperation Agreements: Standardized Procedures for Transnational Prosecution

A series of law enforcement agency cooperation agreements comprise the second aspect of European Union influence on member state criminal law.[46] Law enforcement agency cooperation, in many ways, ties to the operation of agencies like Eurojust. As discussed above, these supranational organizations often facilitate and oversee the cooperation of investigations on the ground level.  However, European Union member states have also adopted several measures that allow for ease of communication and collaboration between entirely separate and local authorities.

The European Union has the authority to enforce measures in five different areas of police cooperation.[47] These include standardized information procedure (collection, storage, processing, analysis, and exchange); shared training of staff and exchange of staff, equipment, and research into crime detection; shared investigative techniques when examining serious organized crime; operational cooperation between different national agencies; and common conditions and limitations under which EU member state authorities may operate in other EU member states.[48] These measures are designed to allow better communication and collaboration between different police agencies, and has allowed for the implementation of information-sharing policies that previously would have been almost impossible to implement.[49]  These policies allow for police cooperation in the prosecution of major transnational areas of crime, such as human trafficking or drug smuggling, which can often span across multiple national jurisdictions and, without transnational standards, would be nearly impossible to investigate.[50] In surveys of official government groups, most respondents agreed with the practical value of these policies.[51]

Cooperation agreements between EU member states serve a tangible, practical benefit to the United Kingdom. Without common European standards for information-gathering and criminal procedure, fighting transnational organized crime in the region would become extremely difficult.  Interestingly, however, Britain already negotiated opt-outs or, in fact, never opted-in to some EU criminal justice measures. Cooperation agreements comprise one such sort of measure. Take, for instance, the Prüm Convention. The Prüm Convention, signed by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria in 2005, was designed to strengthen cross-border cooperation and exchange of information in a variety of criminal justice investigative endeavors.[52] These agreements were adopted before the Lisbon Treaty took effect, but when the treaty was established, the UK was given the option not to participate in the bounds of the Convention.[53]  The Government took that option due to concerns about European Union infringement in national concerns.[54] The Prüm Convention is only one such instance of carefully negotiated legal opt-outs for Britain from EU criminal justice influence.

In the case of international police and investigation cooperation agreements, it seems unlikely that the British withdrawal from the European Union will effect any substantive change in Government policy. As discussed above, Government and criminal justice organizations recognize the importance of these agreements to international prosecutions and investigations. Even after leaving the European Union, Britain would be free to continue to maintain European standards in training and investigation. This continued compliance with EU standards would enable the continued success of transnational investigative efforts. As with the Prüm Convention, the UK could continue to maintain its role in the network of international investigation and comply by EU standards without total integration into the criminal justice conventions and framework.  Brexit, however, may lead to Britain’s exclusion from several of the more codified aspects of international law enforcement agency cooperation agreements, such as shared staff training and equipment exchange. Nevertheless, it seems that Brexit will have little impact, positive or negative, on this aspect of international criminal law.

 

  1. Mutual Recognition Agreements: Blurring the Line between National and European Law

European criminal law still differs on a state-by-state basis.[55] In other words, no static, standard set of laws determines criminal procedure in each EU nation, but instead national courts apply their own set of legal standards to each case set before them, and those judgments determine law in those nations.[56] Nevertheless, concerted efforts have been made by EU governing bodies to harmonize criminal law across the states.[57] Mutual recognition agreements comprise one category of harmonization efforts.  These agreements require courts and other legal authorities in member nations to consider and give effect to judgments by similar governing bodies in other EU countries.[58] These agreements primarily concern criminal decisions and warrants.[59] When another country convicts an individual of a crime or issues a warrant, the open-border policy and ease of transit within the European Union makes flight and resisting arrest much easier than would be the case in other areas. The mutual recognition agreements ensure that these decisions and warrants will be recognized and enforced between states.[60]

The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) remains one of the most well known mutual recognition agreements in the European Union.  The European Arrest Warrant is a piece of EU legislation designed to simplify the surrender of citizens for criminal prosecution or detention.[61] The EAW both facilitates the surrender of criminal suspects or convicts and disallows EU member states from refusing to surrender their own guilty citizens to the authority of another member state.[62] The EAW also guarantees a minimum standard of protections for the accused, similar to the American Bill of Rights, which includes the right to legal assistance and the presumption of innocence.[63] Ultimately, it is meant to provide a safe and efficient way to surrender suspects in the border-free European Union and to protect the basic rights of the accused.[64] The EAW was one of the optional measures established during the Lisbon Treaty, but unlike the Prüm Convention discussed above, the United Kingdom opted into the terms of the EAW.[65]

The EAW, designed to deal with the criminal implications of free movement of people, benefits UK criminal procedure in several key areas.  It significantly reduces the amount of time required for extradition (from 10 months to 3 months), and the number of foreign criminals living and operating in Britain. As such, it also remains an effective method of addressing internationalized crime.[66] Downsides include the potential for false prosecution and cost of EAWs issued for trivial offenses; however, instances of false prosecution remain extremely rare, and international prosecution of trivial offenses could easily continue without the presence of this legislation.[67] In short, Britain, in its current status as an EU member state with free movement of people, derives myriad benefits from the presence and continued operation of this agreement.

As discussed above, the EAW was established to deal with the criminal ramifications of free movement within the European Union.  The continued existence of free movement has been, of course, one of the most contentious aspects of Britain’s exit from the European Union.  In her first major speech after the exit vote, Prime Minister Theresa May clearly articulated that the Government intended to control and limit future immigration within the country.[68]  Free movement within the European Union, many think, will not be a part of the Government’s agenda moving forward; instead, immigration restrictions may significantly increase in years to come.[69] In a nation with increased immigration restrictions that continues to separate itself from the European Union as a whole, the EAW and other mutual recognition agreements may no longer be applicable or desirable. In fact, one of the potential abuses of the EAW is the immense discretion it give EU member states in filing arrest warrants.[70] Many have argued that the application of the EAW represents an abuse of judicial cooperation measures that gives the EU excessive influence in member states.[71] This contradicts the principle of proportionality and could be considered an abuse of rights for the affected individuals.[72] These concerns have been assuaged by the reciprocal trust between EU member states.[73] However, if Britain leaves the European Union and continues to operate under the EAW without that reciprocal trust, the likelihood of warrant abuse and potential risk to individual citizens will drastically increase. This shift represents a genuine potential for abuse of power by EU member states. Without the free movement of people, the conditions that necessitated the construction of the agreement will (hypothetically) cease to exist.  Furthermore, in the fact of growing separation between Britain and the European Union, the motivation for non-abuse of the EAW could significantly decrease and the policy could endanger individual liberties.

Generalizing from the example of the EAW, mutual recognition agreements develop in response to specific geopolitical events and conditions.  The British exit from the European Union both marks a drastic departure from historical trends of governance within Europe and a significant change in legal and economic conditions in the country. As such, many of the mutual recognition agreements negotiated between Britain and the European Union must be reexamined to determine whether their continued existence is beneficial to the parties involved.  It seems likely that many of these agreements, such as the European Arrest Warrant, will significantly change or cease to exist in Britain, in response to the changing conditions within the region. The exact agreements affected by the exit from the European Union remain undetermined, as the terms of Britain’s exit from the body are currently incomplete.  The fact remains, however, that mutual recognition agreements must be reconsidered and altered to reflect changes in governance and policy.

 

  1. Harmonization of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure: Potential for Departure

Organizations across the European Union have made concerted efforts to harmonize both criminal law and criminal procedure of member states.  The harmonization of both laws and procedure aims to ensure that criminal penalties, future legislation, and the legal process remain consistent throughout Europe.[74] In legislature, EU competence aims to approximate criminal laws across national borders.[75]  EU requirements establish minimum requirements in cases of “serious crime with a cross-border dimension” (for instance, corruption, cybercrime, terrorism, etc.), as well as potential approximation and sanction in areas “essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union Policy in an area which has been subject to harmonization measures.”[76] Regarding criminal procedure, European Union requirements aim to enable “mutual recognition” of courtroom processes.[77] The minimum rules apply to mutual admissibility of evidence between EU nations, individual rights in criminal procedure, and rights of crime victims.[78] In order to expand EU influence to other areas, the Council must vote unanimously to approve those measures.[79] This policy deliberately limits the influence of EU influence on local criminal court procedure and makes that influence extremely difficult to expand. Harmonization, then, can be understood as an extremely limited phenomenon, wherein EU member states are held to certain bare minimum standards of criminal investigation and court procedure. The concept of mutual recognition, discussed in Section III.6 of this essay, provides justification for harmonization.  In essence, if governing bodies must recognize and act on judgments from other nations, those courts must be satisfied in the legality, justice, and legitimacy of those judgments.[80] By providing fundamental levels of protection for defendants and uniform treatment of serious cases, European Union requirements reduce the potential for maltreatment of the accused and increase the likelihood that judgments will be seen as legitimate regardless of the nation in which they take place.[81]

The future of harmonization in the wake of the Brexit referendum remains extremely difficult to predict. Harmonious law, as it exists now within the European Union, remains hazily undefined. As with other criminal law requirements, local governments must opt-in to harmony efforts.[82] In several recent instances, the Government has chosen not to opt-in to procedural directives for criminal law.[83] Legal and procedural harmony, it seems, has always occurred at the discretion and through the impetus of a local government. Although it serves the purpose of facilitating mutual recognition in criminal cases, the process of harmonization remained loose and unspecific in order to preserve national governance and sovereignty. As such, Britain remains at its own discretion in regards to harmonization efforts. If the Government wishes to maintain mutual recognition, they must continue to harmonize law and procedure to a satisfactory degree. If mutual recognition is no longer a priority, then they may depart from European Union policy. However, the requirements of harmonious law and procedure remain incredibly sparse. As such, unless British law took a sharp departure from its current standards of protection for parties involved in a lawsuit and current policy, it seems unlikely that any legislation marking a significant departure from harmonization efforts would pass. Ultimately, continued abidance in harmonious laws remains the prerogative of the Government, as it always has been.

 

  1. Conclusions (i.e. What Does this all Mean?)

This paper approached the potential ramifications of Brexit on criminal law in the United Kingdom in four different areas: criminal justice agencies, cooperation agreements, mutual recognition agreements, and harmonization (both in terms of criminal law and procedure).  In the case of criminal justice agencies, by examining the issues at stake with the continued operations of Eurojust in Britain, it became clear that exiting the European Union would pose problems for such agencies. The Government could easily challenge their jurisdiction, continued operations and presence in the United Kingdom and, in the case of Eurojust, the status of personnel as employees of the European Union. In regards to cooperation agreements, continued compliance with these agreements remains in the best interest of the country. Apart from concrete personnel, training, and equipment provisions, continued EU membership does not seem a prerequisite for continued abidance with these policies. Indeed, cooperation agreements ensure the safety of British citizens by making international criminal prosecution easier. Now that these agreements have established procedure, the UK has no impetus to diverge from extant procedure. On the other hand, mutual recognition agreements depend largely upon positive relationships between EU member states and reflect contemporary geopolitical events. As Brexit reshapes Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe and the world, many of these agreements must and will change to reflect the nation’s new status. Finally, the Government may continue or halt criminal law and procedure harmonization at their discretion. Since many of these harmonization efforts are optional for EU member states and do not mark significant departure from British law, change in this area is unlikely.

Of course, the influence of Britain’s exit from the European Union on criminal law cannot be fully understood at this time and expands far beyond the scope of the four categories analyzed in this essay.  Changes in immigration, trade, transportation, and nearly any area of government affected by Brexit have the potential to influence and change criminal law policy.  The variety and complexity of the ramifications explored in this paper speak to the increased involvement of the European Union in member state governance. With the Brexit vote, Britain moves into uncharted waters. Although European Union authorities expanded their influence and jurisdiction over member states in recent years, the close connections between member states and continued membership circumvented many of the potential ramifications of that relationship.  Brexit brings many of these issues to a head. The decisions and negotiations that Britain will undertake in the coming months and years may determine not only the sphere of influence of EU criminal law and law enforcement organizations, but also the potential for continued international legal cooperation in Europe as a whole.

 

[1] A timeline of Britain’s EU membership in Guardian reporting, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/a-timeline-of-britains-eu-membership-in-guardian-reporting.

[2] Oliver Wright and Charlie Cooper, Brexit: What is it and why are we having an EU referendum? THE INDEPENDENT( June 23, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/what-is-brexit-why-is-there-an-eu-referendum-a7042791.html.

[3] Id. Wright and Cooper

[4] . Wright and Cooper, supra note 2.

[5] Ibid Wright and Cooper, supra note 2.

Maastricht Treaty, BBC NEWS, (April 30 April 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216944.stm.

[6] Rishi Iyengar, These 3 Facts Explain Why the U.K. Held the ‘Brexit’ Referendum, TIME (June 24, 2016), http://time.com/4381184/uk-brexit-european-union-referendum-cameron/.

Rowena Mason, How did UK end up voting to leave the European Union? THE GUARDIAN, June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-did-uk-end-up-voting-leave-european-union.

[7] Mason, supra note 6.

[8] Iyengar, supra note 6.

[9] RONALD F. INGLEHART AND PIPPA NORRIS, TRUMP, BREXIT, AND THE RISE OF POPULISM: ECONOMIC HAVE-NOTS AND CULTURAL BACKLASH, pg. 1 ( Harvard Kennedy School, 2016).

[10] I Id.

[11]  Inglehart and Norris, supra note 9.

[12] Iyengar, supra note 6.

[13] 6KBW College Hill, Brexit Briefing No. 1: What are the implications for criminal law? (July 4, 2016), http://www.6kbw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/6KBW20Brexit20Briefing20No201-2.pdf.

[14]  6KBW College Hill, supra note 13.

[15] Criminal Justice, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (November 24, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/index_en.htm.

[16] Id.

[17]. Criminal Justice, supra note 15.

Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty, BBC, (January 17, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6901353.stm.

[18] Criminal Justice, supra note 15.

[19] 6KBW College Hill, supra note 13.

J.R. Spencer, What would Brexit mean for criminal justice? FULL FACT, (June 8, 2016), https://fullfact.org/europe/what-would-brexit-mean-criminal-justice/.

[20] Id.

[21] Spencer, supra note 19.

[22] Spencer, supra note 19.

[23] Spencer, supra note 19.

[24] Spencer, supra note 19.

[25] Spencer, supra note 19.

[26] Spencer, supra note 19.

[27] Spencer, supra note 19.

[28] Spencer, supra note 19.

[29]  Michiel Luchtman & John Vervaele, European Agencies for Criminal Justice and Shared Enforcement (Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office), 10, Issue 5, UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 132 (December 2014).

[30] Justice, freedom and security, EUR-LEX: ACCESS TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW, (November 29, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/justice_freedom_security.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D23,SUM_2_CODED%3D2307&locale=en.

[31]Justice, freedom and security, supra note 30.

[32] Luchtman & Vervaele, supra note 29, at 132.

[33] Mission and tasks, EUROJUST: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S JUDICIAL COOPERATION UNIT (November 30, 2016), http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/mission-tasks.aspx.

[34] Mission and tasks, supra note 33..

[35]Mission and tasks, supra note 33..

[36] Luchtman & Vervaele, supra note 29, at 132.

[37] Id, at 133-134.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41] Title V: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION C 115, 73 (2008), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/lisbon-treaty-jha.pdf.

[42] Luchtman & Vervaele, supra note 29, at 134.

[43] Id, at 134-135.

[44] Id, at 135.

[45] Id.

[46]  Spencer, supra note 19.

[47] HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Police and Criminal Justice (2014). Accessed 30 November, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388645/PCJBoCreport.pdf#page=47.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Cross-border law enforcement cooperation – UK participation in Prüm,”, PARLIAMENT (November 30, 2016), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmeuleg/342-xii/34205.htm.

[53] Cross-border law, supra note 52..

[54] Cross-border law, supra note 52..

[55] Judicial co-operation in criminal matters: mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal matters, EUR-LEX: ACCESS TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW November 30, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33131.

[56] Judicial co-operation, supra note 55. .

[57] Judicial co-operation, supra note 55..

[58]  Spencer, supra note 19.

[59]6KBW College Hill, supra note 13.

[60]  6KBW College Hill, supra note 13.

[61] European Arrest Warrant, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (November 24, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-decision/european-arrest-warrant/index_en.htm.

[62]. European Arrest Warrant, supra note 61.

[63]European Arrest Warrant, supra note 61..

[64]European Arrest Warrant, supra note 61..

[65] Luke Lythgoe, European Arrest Warrant pros outweigh cons, INFACTS, (November 30, 2016), https://infacts.org/briefings/european-arrest-warrant-pros-outweigh-cons/.

[66] Ibid. Lythgoe, supra note 65.

[67] Ibid.  Lythgoe, supra note 65.

[68] Jennifer Rankin, Freedom of movement: the wedge that will split Britain from Europe, THE GUARDIAN, (October 6, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/06/freedom-of-movement-eu-uk-brexit-negotiations-theresa-may.

[69]Rankin, supra note 68. .

[70] Constantino Grasso, The European Arrest Warrant, THE UK IN A CHANGING EUROPE(November 30, 2016), http://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-arrest-warrant-eaw/.

[71]Grasso, supra note 70..

[72]Grasso, supra note 70..

[73]Grasso, supra note 70.

[74] 6KBW College Hill, supra note 13.

Spencer, supra note 19.

[75] HM Government, supra note 47, at 59.

[76] Id.

Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 83(1) and 83(2), EUR-LEX: ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION LAW November 30, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT.

[77] HM Government, supra note 47, at 54.

[78] Id.

[79] Id.

[80]  Spencer, supra note 19. .

[81] HM Government, supra note 47, at 54.

[82] Id, at 55.

[83] Id

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